Book Review: “Phase Line Green: The Battle for Huế, 1968” By Nicholas Warr

Fifteen years after returning from the Vietnam War, Nicholas Warr began writing Phase Line Green as a catharsis. Then, while researching, he discovered an equally compelling reason for recording his experiences: According to The combat after-action report and command chronology of the battle for the Citadel of Huế … every effort was made to provide artillery, air strikes, and naval gunfire support to the troops from the ground from the beginning of the battle. … American attacks during this battle were made “upon completion of prep fires [and] walking artillery in front of advancing troops.” (Prep fires were days of softening up the enemy with heavy artillery and air attacks.) No one knew better than Warr that the report was revisionist propaganda camouflaging overly restrictive rules of engagement that needlessly killed dozens of United States Marines. (Rules of engagement are rules or directives to military forces [including individuals] that define the circumstances, conditions, degree, and manner in which force … may be applied) (1).

GreenLineAs Phase Line Green opens, then 2nd Lieutenant Warr, is crouched behind a wall serving as the radio operator for Bravo Company’s attempt to cross phase line green. (Phase lines are lines drawn on battle maps frequently established in conventional warfare for coordination and control during an assault.) His only companion, a dead dog, was apt company for a man who had … become that most worthless of human beings, a commander with no one to command.

On February 11, 1968, the 1,050 men of 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (1/5 – pronounced “One Five”) deployed from Vietnam’s mountains and jungles to the City of Huế, the heart of Vietnam’s cultural, religious, and political history. Their orders to reclaim the Citadel’s southeast corner from the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) seemed ordinary - until their first glimpse of the ancient Citadel, a fortress one-and-a-half miles square delineated by red clay brick walls thirty-feet high and nine-feet thick. The next morning, 1/5 loaded onto boats for delivery to the back door, where hundreds of Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) soldiers lay wounded and dying. Like the Americans, the ARVN had sorely underestimated the NVA’s manpower and ferocity, determination and courage.

That evening1st Lt. Scott A. Nelson, Commanding Officer of Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (Charlie 1/5), ordered company officers (Warr was platoon commander of Charlie Company’s 1st Platoon, dubbed “Charlie One”) to position their men on phase line green by 0800 the next morning and await his order for the first assault. Their objective was wresting control of seven phase lines (blocks) from the NVA by the next afternoon. And, “Because the Citadel of Huế is a national landmark, and because it and the Imperial Palace are considered by all Vietnamese as sacred ground, the decision has been made to assault without prep fires. Furthermore, to preserve the fortress and palace, artillery support, air strikes, and naval gunfire were forbidden. Finally, tanks could shoot their machine guns, but were not to … fire their ninety-millimeter cannons under any circumstances. Grenades could be thrown if absolutely necessary, but small-arms’ fire was considered ample force. Warr writes: The powers that be had established the rules of engagement, and we would go forward across phase line green using the limited firepower of our small-arms’ weapons, or we would die. And, so, Charlie One died.

As Charlie One moved into point position (assault leader) the next morning, the NVA fired from the first and second floors and roofs of the houses on the other side of phase line green, about 24 paces away. Simultaneously, Several automatic weapons raked the street from the tower that protected the eastern entrance. Three men died and others lay wounded in the street with no chance of rescue. Despite Warr’s pleas for heavy support, Nelson ordered three assaults that day, sending the Marines of Charlie One into the NVA’s point blank fire. When Nelson finally appeared on phase line green late that afternoon, he realized that Warr had not been exaggerating and requested permission for heavy weapons from battalion headquarters. They, and everyone above them in the chain of command, refused.

That night, Charlie One was declared … no longer an effective fighting unit … Five men had died, 24 seriously injured men were evacuated for medical care, and the 22 unharmed men were transferred to Charlie Companies Two and Three. Warr was assigned to be Charlie Company’s Executive Officer, which translated into opening ammunition boxes. Early the next morning, Nelson ordered him to be company forward observer for Bravo Company, the next company to be decimated at phase line green.

As Warr conversed with the dead dog, he listened to a replay of the previous day: I could still hear the shooting clearly and I could hear the results of the stupidity – the screams and the agony of the last moments of the dead and the curses of those who lay dying in the street. On February 15, after repeated frontal assaults by two Marine Infantry companies, resulting in dozens of Marines killed at phase line green and nearly 40% casualties for the entire battalion, the chain of command finally granted heavy weapons’ support.

Warr, as Charlie Three Platoon Commander, on February 16, again faced phase line green, expecting to die. Instead, they discovered that the NVA had retreated to phase line orange, one block back. As they prepared for another frontal assault into point blank fire, an Ontos (… a small, speedy armored vehicle … with six mounted 106mm recoilless rifles) blasted the NVA. This deadly tactic proved … a major asset … throughout the rest of the battle … and significantly added to our momentum. On February 26, … the southeast sector of the Citadel was finally secured.

On March 5, 1968, the few remaining men of Charlie 1/5 loaded into boats with only eleven of the original 51 men of Charlie Company One aboard. Warr recalled: No one looked back … I think most of us felt that if we had looked back at the Citadel, we would all turn into blocks of salt. It was over.

The most admirable quality of Phase Line Green is Warr’s absolute honesty about his fears. Reality hit, before deployment, when he recognized the names of Marines killed in Vietnam as his Basic School classmates five weeks earlier. He writes, … at that moment the first seed of doubt entered my mind. After receiving his assignment as the Platoon Commander of the 1st Platoon of Charlie 1/5, he admits … I was terrified that I was not ready to be in command and that I would do or say something that would get people killed. Asking SSgt. John A. “Mother” Mullan, an experienced platoon commander, for guidance … proved to be one of the best decisions I made while in Vietnam.

Warr first notices his human-observer/automaton-lieutenant split personality as he watches two Vietnamese men retrieving a dead family from the rubble. Outwardly, Warr remains the competent officer fully in command; inside, he mourns the family. After the NVA ambush, Warr admits … I could just not deal with the cruelty and savagery of our situation on phase line green and the death of many good men … Fortunately, the voice of Sergeant Mullan (killed during the first ambush) chided … you get caught looking too closely at ‘Nam, you’ll step in shit every time. With that, his human-observer disappears until Warr counts the eleven men on the boat.

Before leaving for the Republic of Vietnam, 2nd Lieutenant Nicholas Warr had applied for a regular commission in the … fraternity of the leadership of the greatest fighting force on the planet, the United States Marine Corps. After leaving Huế and returning to the Phu Bai Combat Base, the company’s first sergeant presented Warr with his acceptance notice. Without another thought, he shredded the papers. Nicholas Warr left Vietnam on December 8, 1968, returned to civilian life, and started the grueling process of trying to comprehend the torment that he and his men had encountered.

Sources Cited

1. Wikipedia contributors. “Rules of Engagement.” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. 6 Apr. 2015. Web. 4 May. 2015.

BIO

Nicholas Warr grew up in Oregon and attended Brigham Young University and the University of Oregon before enlisting, at the age of twenty, in the United States Marine Corps. Warr was recommended for the Enlisted Commissioning Program by his Drill Instructors in Boot Camp, and subsequently attended OCS at Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia. Warr graduated from OCS and was commissioned in March 1967.

After attending The Basic School and a six-week high-intensity Vietnamese language training course, his first assignment as an infantry officer sent him to the Republic of Vietnam from November 1967 until December 1968. He served with the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, 1st Marine Division as a Platoon Commander, Company Executive Officer, and Company Commander during some of the toughest fighting in the Vietnam War.

Warr’s unit was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for participation in Operation “HUE CITY” during the Tet Offensive of 1968, and he was honorably discharged as a first lieutenant in March 1970. Phase Line Green, The Battle for Huế, 1968, on the Marine Reading List for over ten years, is well read within the Marine Corps, and is often used as a textbook during Marine Corps training for Urban Warfare.

Mr. Warr continues to write about the battles fought by the Marines during the Vietnam War. He recently appeared in a new documentary episode about the Battle for Hue City during the Tet Offensive of 1968, on the Military Channel, within their new “Ultimate Warfare” series, and the Marine Corps University has developed a decision-forcing course for young infantry leaders in training called “Charlie-1,” based on his experiences as a Platoon Commander during the Battle for Hue.


Mr. Warr lives in Hendersonville, North Carolina, with his wife, the former Pamela Alexander, who grew up in Hendersonville and graduated from Hendersonville High School. He works as a free-lance writer, and lectures inside and outside of the Marine Corps on urban warfare and leadership.

Contact information: [email protected]

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